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Abstract
Recently, an image scrambling encryption algorithm of pixel bit based on chaos map was proposed.
Considering the algorithm as a typical binary image scrambling/permutation algorithm exerting
on plaintext of size M × (8N), this paper proposes a novel optimal method to break it with some
known/chosen-plaintexts. The spatial complexity and computational complexity of the attack are
only O(32 · MN) and O(16 · n0 · MN) respectively, where n0 is the number of known/chosen-
plaintexts used. The method can be easily extended to break any permutation-only encryption
scheme exerting on plaintext of size M ×N and with L different levels of values. The correspond-
ing spatial complexity and computational complexity are only O(MN) and O(dlogL(MN)e ·MN)
respectively. In addition, some specific remarks on the performance of the image scrambling en-
cryption algorithm are presented.
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1. Introduction
With rapid development of digital information technology, image data is transmitted over all
kinds of wired/wireless channels more and more frequently. Consequently, security of image data
becomes more and more important. However, the traditional text encryption schemes fail to pro-
tect image data efficiently due to the big differences between image data and text, e.g. strong
redundancy existing in uncompressed image data and its bulky size. In addition, image encryp-
tion schemes have some special requirements such as fast handling speed and easy concatenation
of different components of the whole image processing system. Therefore, designing encryption
schemes protecting image data specially becomes an urgent task. Due to the subtle similarities
between cryptography and chaos, a great number of image encryption schemes based on chaos or
other nonlinear theories have been proposed in the past decade [1–7]. Unfortunately, most of them
have been found to be insecure to different extents from the viewpoint of modern cryptography
[8–16]. For more discussion on chaos-based image encryption schemes, please refer to [17, 18].
In [19], an image permutation algorithm was proposed by scrambling/permuting binary bit
of every pixel with pseudo-random number sequence generated by chaotic logistic map. Essen-
tially, it is a permutation-only algorithm exerting on a binary image of size M × (8N). The
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present paper focuses on security analysis of the algorithm and reports the following results: 1)
an optimal method is proposed to break the image permutation algorithm under study with some
known/chosen plaintexts; 2) the method is extended to break any permutation-only encryption
scheme exerting on elements of any different levels of values; 3) some remarks on the performance
of the image permutation algorithm under study are given.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the image permutation
algorithm under study. Section 3 proposes the optimal known/chosen-plaintext attack based on
a binary tree to break the algorithm and points out some remarks on the performance on it.
Extension of the optimal attack to break any permutation-only multimedia encryption schemes is
discussed in Sec. 4. The last section concludes the paper.
2. The image permutation algorithm under study
The plaintext encrypted by the image permutation algorithm under study is a gray-scale image
of size M × N (height×width), which can be denoted by an M × N matrix in domain Z256,
I = [I(i, j)]M−1,N−1i=0,j=0 . The image I is further represented as an M × (8N) binary matrix B =
[B(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 , where I(i, j) =
∑7
k=0B(i, l) · 2k, l = 8 · j + k. The corresponding cipher-image
is I ′ = [I ′(i, j)]M−1,N−1i=0,j=0 , I
′(i, j) =
∑7
k=0B
′(i, l) · 2k, l = 8 · j + k. Then, the image permutation
algorithm can be described as follows1.
• The secret key : three positive integers m, n, and T , and the initial condition x0 ∈ (0, 1) and
control parameter µ ∈ (3.569945672, 4) of the following chaotic Logistic map:
f(x) = µ · x · (1− x). (1)
• The initialization procedure: 1) run the map Eq. (1) from x0 to generate a chaotic sequence,
{xk}max {(m+M),(n+8MN)}k=1 ; 2) generate an vector TM of length M , where SM (TM (i)) is the
(i+ 1)-th largest element of SM = {xm+k}Mk=1, 0 ≤ i ≤ (M − 1); 3) generate a matrix TN of
size M × (8N), where, ∀ i ∈ {0, · · · ,M − 1}, SN (TN (i, j)) is the (j + 1)-th largest element
of SN = {xn+(8N)i+k}8Nk=1 , 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
• The encryption procedure:
– Step 1 – vertical permutation: generate an intermediate matrixB∗ = [B∗(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 ,
where
B∗(i, :) = B(TM (i), :); (2)
– Step 2 – horizontal permutation: generate an intermediate matrixB′ = [B′(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 ,
where
B′(i, l) = B∗(i,TN (i, l)); (3)
– Step 3 – repetition: reset the value of x0 to the current state of Eq. (1), and repeat the
above operations from the initialization procedure for (T − 1) times.
1To make the presentation more concise and complete, some notations in the original paper are modified, and
some details about the algorithm are also supplied or corrected.
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• The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption one except the following simple modi-
fications: 1) the different rounds of encryption are exerted in a reverse order; 2) the order of
Step 1 and Step 2 in each round is reversed; 3) the left parts and right parts of Eq (2) and
Eq. (3) are exchanged, respectively.
3. Cryptanalysis
3.1. Known-plaintext attack
The known-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has some
samples of both the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext and make use of them to reveal
secret information, such as secret keys and/or its equivalent ones.
Apparently, the combination of multiple rounds of the operations in the encryption procedure
can be represented by an M×(8N) permutation matrix W = [w(i, l)]M,8Ni=0,l=0, where w(i, l) = (i′, l′)
denotes the secret position of the plain bit B(i, j) in B′. That is, the permutation matrix W
defines a bijective map on set M × N+, where M = {0, · · · ,M − 1} and N+ = {0, · · · , 8N − 1}.
Once the attacker recovers the permutation matrix W and then obtains its inverse W−1, he can
use it as an equivalent key to decrypt any cipher-image encrypted with the same secret key.
Since that the secret permutation does not change the values of the permuted elements, a
general algorithm was proposed in [20] for obtaining the permutation matrix by comparing the
values of the elements of some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts. Based on the same
mechanism, a novel optimal method is proposed here to break the image permutation algorithm
under study.
Actually, the proposed method is the construction process of a binary tree, where every node
includes five components in order: a pointer holding address of the left child node, PTL; two sets
containing some entry positions of plain-image and cipher-image, respectively; cardinality of one
of the two sets; a pointer holding address of the right child node, PTR. Denote the two sets in
the root node with B and B′, respectively, where B = B′ = M × N+. Obviously, cardinality of B,
|B| = 8MN . Then, the binary tree can be constructed as follows.
• ∀ (i, l) ∈ B, do the following operations:{
add (i, l) into B1 if B(i, l) = 1;
add (i, l) into B0 if B(i, l) = 0.
(4)
• ∀ (i, l) ∈ B′, do the following operations:{
add (i, l) into B′1 if B′(i, l) = 1;
add (i, l) into B′0 if B′(i, l) = 0.
• Delete the elements in the two sets of root node and set the fourth item of the node as zero.
Since the secret permutation does not change the values of the permuted elements, the cardi-
nalities of the two sets in the two child nodes are always the same. Hence, only the cardinality of
one set is needed to record. The basic structure of the binary tree is shown in Fig. 1. With more
pairs of known-images and the corresponding cipher-images, the binary tree will be updated and
expanded iteratively with the following steps.
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• Search for all nodes whose third item is greater than one, namely, both the corresponding
two sets have more than one elements;
• Expand each found node with the similar operations shown above.
PTL B1 B′1 |B1| PTR PTL B0 B′0 |B0| PTR
PTL B B′ |B| PTR




A
A
A
AU
Figure 1: Basic structure of the binary tree.
After the construction of the binary tree is completed, we now investigate how to obtain the
estimated version of the permutation matrixW from the tree. To facilitate the following discussion,
let Bi, B′i and |Bi| denote the middle three items of a leaf node, respectively. Apparently, w(i, l)
can be uniquely determined if and only if |Bi| = 1. Otherwise, one has to guess one from |Bi|!
possible cases. For the whole permutation matrix, there are ΠPi=1(|Bi|!) possible cases, where P is
the number of leaf nodes in the binary tree. For simplicity, we derive the permutation matrix by
mapping the elements in Bi and B′i one by one in order.
Next, we investigate how many known-images are sufficient to achieve an acceptable breaking
performance. Roughly speaking, ΠPi=1(|Bi|!) rapidly decrease when the number of known-images,
n0, is increased. The less value of Π
P
i=1(|Bi|!) means more accurate estimation of the permutation
matrix. To simplify the analyses, we assume that each element in B distributes uniformly over
{0, 1}, and any two elements are independent of each other. Then, the elements of Bi can be
divided into the following two types:
• the sole right position, which occurs definitely;
• other fake positions, each of which occurs in Bi with a probability of 1/2n0 , since one condition
in Eq. (4) is satisfied consecutively for n0 times.
Let n8 denote the number of error bits in a recovered pixel, it can be calculated that Prob(n8 =
i) =
(
8
i
) · (1− pb)i · (pb)8−i, where pb = 11+(8MN−1)/2n0 , i = 0 ∼ 8. Generally speaking, when every
bit is determined correctly with a probability larger than a half, namely pb > 0.5, the decryption
will be acceptable. Solve the inequality, one has
n0 > dlog2(8MN − 1)e. (5)
To verify the performance of the above known-plaintext attack, a number of experiments have
been performed on a number of randomly selected natural images of size 256 × 256. In this case,
Eq. (5) become n0 > dlog2(219 − 1)e = 19. With a randomly selected secret key (x0, µ,m, n, T ) =
(0.2009, 3.98, 20, 51, 4), a plain-image “Peppers” and its encrypted version are shown in Figs. 2a)
and b), respectively. Let W20 and W25 denote the estimated version of the permutation matrix W
obtained from 20 and 25 known plain-images, respectively. The decrypted version of Fig. 2b) with
W20 and W25 is shown in Figs. 2c) and d) respectively. It is found that most visual information
contained in the original plain-image has been recovered in Fig. 2c), although only 23509/65536 ≈
35.8% of plain pixels are correct in value. This is attributed to the following two main reasons:
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• human eyes have a powerful capability for excluding image noises and recognizing significant
information;
• due to strong redundancy in natural images, two pixel values are close to each other with a
probability larger than the average one, hence many incorrectly recovered pixels are close to
their true values with a probability larger than the average one also.
Distribution of difference between the recovered plain-image, shown in Fig. 2c), and the corre-
sponding original plain-image is shown in Fig. 3a). The similar data on the recovered plain-image
shown in Fig. 2d) is also illustrated in Fig. 3b) for comparison. With some noise reduction schemes,
the recovered plain-images can be enhanced further. The results of two images shown in Figs. 2c)
and d) with a 3× 3 median filter are shown in Figs. 4a) and b), respectively.
a) b)
c) d)
Figure 2: The image “Peppers” recovered by know-plaintext attack: a) “Peppers”; b) the encrypted “Peppers”; c)
recovered “Peppers” via W20; d) recovered “Peppers” via W25.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of correctly-recovered elements, including plain-bit, plain-pixel
and the elements of permutation matrix, with respect to the number of known plain-images. One
can see that the breaking performance is good when n0 ≥ 20. It can also be observed that the
slopes of the three lines shown in Fig. 5 are very flat when n0 ≥ 25. This is due to the negative
impact incurred by the strong redundancy in natural images such as the MSBs of neighboring pixels
are the same with a high probability. This point has been proved quantitatively in [20]. Now, one
can see that the non-uniform distribution of most natural images has two opposite influences on
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Figure 3: Distribution of non-zero difference between two recovered plain-images and the original plain-image: a)
the one shown in Fig. 2c); b) the one shown in Fig. 2d), where x-axis denotes specific difference and y-axis denotes
the corresponding counts.
the final breaking. The experiments have shown that the above analysis result obtained under the
assumption of uniform distribution also holds for the case of ordinary natural images.
a) b)
Figure 4: The enhanced results of applying a 3 × 3 median filter to the two recovered plain-images: a) the image
shown in Fig. 2c); b) the image shown in Fig. 2b).
Obviously, the spatial complexity and the computational complexity of the proposed known-
plaintext attack are only O(32 ·MN) and O(16 · n0 ·MN), respectively.
3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack
The chosen-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis which assumes that the at-
tacker has the capability to arbitrarily choose some plaintexts to be encrypted and observe the
corresponding ciphertexts. The goal of the attack is to optimize the attack performance con-
sidering the special properties of the encryption scheme when the plaintexts are with a specific
structure.
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Figure 5: The percentage of correctly-recovered elements with respect to the number of known plain-images.
As for the image permutation algorithm under study, at least nc = dlog2(8MN)e = 3 +
dlog2(MN)e chosen plain-images are needed to make cardinality of the set in every leaf node of the
binary tree for breaking is equal to one, namely, every element of the permutation matrix can be
recovered exactly. First, construct an M × (8N) matrix in domain Z2nc , B+ = [B+(i, l)]M−1,8N−1i=0,l=0 ,
whose elements are different from each other. Then, the chosen plain-images {It}nc−1i=0 can be
chosen/constructed as follows:
It(i, j) =
∑7
k=0
B+t (i, l) · 2k,
where
∑nc−1
t=0 B
+
t (i, l) · 2t = B+(i, l) and l = 8 · j + k.
3.3. Some remarks on the performance on the image permutation algorithm under study
• Weak randomness of vectors TM and TN
Obviously, randomness of vectors TM and TN depends on randomness of the sequences
generated by iterating Logistic map. Note that convincing argument for good randomness
of a sequence is not the so-called complex theories based but whether it can pass a series of
objective tests [21]. As shown in [22, Sec. 3.1], Logistic maps cannot serve as a good random
number generator. This point can also be guessed by observing distribution of the trajectory
of Logistic map, which is mainly determined by the control parameter [23]. For illustration,
distribution of two trajectories of Logistic map with the same initial condition and control
parameter used in [19, Sec. 2] is shown in Fig. 6.
• Fail to encrypt images of fixed value zero or 255
For both the two images, all elements of the corresponding intermediate matrix B∗ are the
same, which make all the encryption procedures do nothing.
• Insensitivity with respect to changes of plaintext
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Figure 6: Distribution of two trajectories of the map Eq. (1) with control parameter µ = 3.5786: a) x0 = 0.3333; b)
x0 = 0.5656.
Sensitivity with respect to changes of plaintext is very important for any image encryption
scheme since an image and its watermarked version may be encrypted at the same time. In
cryptography, the most ideal state about the sensitivity is that the change of any single bit
of plaintext will make every bit of the corresponding ciphertext change with a probability
of one half. Unfortunately, the image permutation algorithm under study does not consider
this property at all.
• Equivalent sub-key
Since f(x) = f(1− x), x0 and (1− x0) are equivalent sub-keys for decryption.
• Unchanged histogram on plain-bit
Although the histogram on plain-byte is changed by the image permutation algorithm under
study, the one on plain-bit keep unchanged, which make the cipher-image still reveal some
information of the plain-image.
• Low efficiency
The generation method of permutation matrixes TM and TN make the computational com-
plexity of the image permutation algorithm under study is O(M · (8N)2), which is even much
larger than that of DES.
4. Known/chosen-plaintext attack on any permutation-only multimedia encryption
schemes
As shown in [20], no matter what the permuted elements of multimedia data are, all permutation-
only multimedia encryption schemes on a plaintext of size M ×N can be represented as
I∗(w(i, j)) = I(i, j),
where the permutation matrix W = [w(i, j) = (i′, j′) ∈M× N]M×N , M = {0, · · · ,M − 1} and
N = {0, · · · , N − 1}. Then it was analyzed that permutation-only multimedia encryption can be
broken with only O(dlogL(MN)e) known/chosen plaintexts, where L is the number of different
elements in the plaintext. The breaking method proposed in [20, Sec. 3.1] includes the following
three key steps:
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• Step 1 : obtain a set containing all possible secret positions for each entry of the plaintext by
comparing every pair of plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext;
• Step 2 : solve the intersection of the different sets corresponding to each entry of plaintext;
• Step 3 : get an estimated version of the permutation matrix by choosing a secret position of
an entry plaintext from the final set corresponding to it.
The operations in Step 2 make the computational complexity of the above attack become
O(n0 ·MN2). It is found that the complex intersection operations can be avoided by extending the
idea proposed in Sec. 3.1, namely constructing a multi-branch tree, where every node includes 2L+3
components: 2L pointers holding addresses of 2L possible child nodes; two sets containing some
entry positions in plain-image and cipher-image, respectively; and cardinality of one of the two
sets. Let B, B′, and |B| denote the last three items in the root node. Initially, set B = B′ = M×N,
and |B| = MN . Then, the multi-branch tree can be constructed as follows.
• ∀ (i, j) ∈ B, add (i, j) to the first set of the child nodes to which the I(i, j)-th item of the
current node points;
• ∀ (i, j) ∈ B′, add (i, j) to the second set of the child nodes to which the I ′(i, j)-th item of the
current node points.
• Delete the elements of the sets in the root node and set the last item of the node as zero.
With more pairs of known/chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images, the multi
branch can be updated and expanded iteratively with the following steps:
• Search for all nodes whose last item is greater than one;
• Expand and update each found node with the similar operations shown above.
Once construction of the multi-branch tree is completed, the permutation matrix W can be
estimated by simply mapping the elements in the two sets of every leaf node in order.
Finally, combine the performance analysis of the known/chosen-plaintext attack presented in
[20], we can conclude that any permutation-only multimedia encryption schemes exerting on plain-
text of size M × N can be efficiently broken with O(dlogL(MN)e) known/chosen-plaintexts, and
spatial complexity and computational complexity of the attack are O(MN) and O(n0 ·MN), re-
spectively. Substitute n0 with dlogL(MN)e, the complexity becomes O(dlogL(MN)e ·MN), which
is lower much than O(dlogL(MN)e ·MN2), the whole attack complexity estimated in [20].
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the security of an image permutation encryption algorithm is analyzed. An
optimal method, in term of spatial complexity and computational complexity, is proposed to break
the binary image permutation algorithm. Furthermore, the method can be extended to break any
permutation-only multimedia encryption schemes with an optimal performance also. In addition,
some specific remarks on the performance of the image scrambling encryption algorithm under
study are provided. Again, this cryptanalysis paper proves that the security of a good image
encryption scheme should rely on a combination of traditional cryptography and special properties
of image data, like the schemes proposed in [24, 25].
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